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Abstract—In this paper, the problem of distributed power
allocation is considered for the downlink of a cloud radio access
network (CRAN) that is coexisting with a heterogeneous network.
In this multi-tier system, the heterogeneous network base stations
(BSs) as well as the CRAN remote radio heads seek to choose
their optimal power to maximize their users’ rates. The problem
is formulated as a noncooperative game in which the players are
the CRAN’s cloud and the BSs. Given the difference of capabilities
between the CRAN and the various BSs, the game is cast within
the framework of cognitive hierarchy theory. In this framework,
players are organized in a hierarchy in such a way that a player
can choose its strategy while considering players of only similar
or lower hierarchies. Using such a hierarchical design, one can
reduce the interference caused by the CRAN and high-powered
base stations on low-powered BSs. For this game, the properties
of the Nash equilibrium and the cognitive hierarchy equilibrium
are analyzed. Simulation results show that the proposed cognitive
hierarchy model yields significant performance gains, in terms of
the total rate, reaching up to twice the rate achieved by a classical
noncooperative game’s Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The deployment of a cloud-based radio access network
(CRAN) is expected to be an integral part of 5G networks
[1]. In CRAN, remote radio heads (RRHs), which are small
radio antennas responsible for transmission, cooperate to serve
their wireless users. To achieve such coordination, the RRHs
are connected through a fronthaul link to a control unit (CU)
that performs efficient signal processing. However, in CRAN,
the fronthaul links are often of finite capacity [2], and thus, the
number of RRHs connected to the CU will be limited. Thus,
the CRAN will need to co-exist with the small cell base stations
(BSs) of an existing heterogeneous cellular network (HetNet).
In particular, in the downlink, the presence of a large number
of RRHs can increase the interference on HetNet users. Thus, it
is imperative to devise new solutions for optimized interference
management in such a hybrid CRAN-HetNet architecture [2].
In the existing literature, the problem of downlink interfer-
ence mitigation has been considered mainly within the context
of HetNets [3]–[5]. The objective is to reduce to the interference
caused by the high-powered macro BSs on the low-powered
femto and pico BSs. These techniques range from power control
[3] to the allocation of frequency and time resources such as
in [4] and [5]. More recent works such as in [6] considered
interference mitigation for a CRAN using MIMO techniques.
The authors in [7] studied the challenge of limited fronthaul ca-
pacity in CRAN, and derived the optimal power allocations that
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maximize the system’s sum-rates under a constrained fronthaul.
In [8], the authors proposed a centralized resource allocation
technique for the downlink of a CRAN coexisting with a macro
BS. However, this existing body of work is either focused on
CRAN or HetNets, in isolation, or in a very restricted setting.
Thus, none of these works addresses the problem of interference
management in hybrid CRAN/small cell architectures.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a novel
framework for power control and interference management that
can ensure an efficient HetNet and CRAN co-existence. We
formulate the problem as a noncooperative game between the
CRAN and HetNet’s BSs. In this game, each base station seeks
to choose its optimal power allocation to maximize the sum-rate
of its users. Given the heterogeneity of the system, we cast the
game within the framework of cognitive hierarchy theory [12]
in which players can be organized into multi-tier hierarchies
depending on their capabilities, unlike in classical Stackelberg
games that allow only for a two level pre-determined hierarchy
[13]. For our model, the hierarchy pertains to the fact that
computationally capable and high-powered BSs, such as the
CRAN or the macrocell BSs can have a higher hierarchy in the
network than smaller BSs, such as femtocells. Such a hierarchi-
cal organization eventually allows reducing the interference on
low-powered BSs as they no longer need to consider the actions
of the devices with higher power capabilities. In contrast, by
being at the top of the hierarchy, high-powered BSs such as the
CRAN and macrocell BSs will be more conservative in their
power control decisions. For both the conventional game and
the cognitive hierarchy game, we characterize the equilibrium
solutions and study their properties. Simulation results show
that the proposed cognitive hierarchy model yields a two-
fold improvement in the total system rate, when compared
with a classical game-theoretic model. The results also show
considerable interference reduction on the low-powered BSs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
system model and the power allocation problem. Section III
presents the game theoretic formulation of the problem as well
as the Nash equilibrium and the cognitive hierarchy solutions
respectively. Section IV presents the simulation results. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the downlink of a CRAN composed of a set Kc
of remote radio heads (RRH) serving cooperatively a set Nc
of users. All RRHs are connected to a central cloud-based
control unit (CU) via finite capacity fronthaul link. The CU is
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
04
19
8v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
4 J
un
 20
16
responsible for the resource allocation and the signal processing
of the RRHs, while the RRHs are responsible only for data
transmission.
Due to the finite capacity of the fronthaul, there is a maximum
number of RRHs that could be connected to the CU. Hence, the
CRAN must co-exist with a HetNet composed of a set M of
macro BSs, a set P of pico BSs, and a set F femto BSs. Each
BS i ∈ H = M ∪ P ∪ F has a set Ni of users to serve.
Each user j ∈ ∪i∈HNi ∪ Nc is located at a distance dij from
BS i ∈ H or from RRH i ∈ Kc. OFDMA transmissions of L
subcarriers are also assumed at each BS in H and RRH in the
CRAN. The channel gain hijk between each BS/RRH i and user
j over subcarrier k is distributed according to an independent
Rayleigh fading. The received power of a user j over subcarrier
k is Prijk = |hijk|2pikd−αij where α is the path loss exponent
and pik is the transmission power of BS/RRH i over subcarrier
k. Additive white Gaussian noise of variance σ2 is present at
each receiver. In our model, each BS/RRH i can transmit with
a maximum power Pi,max, and each mobile user has a single
receive antenna.
In the CRAN, the CU assigns subcarrier k to a single user
in Nc and all RRHs transmit simultaneously to that user. The
CU uses beamforming to coordinate the transmissions of the
RRHs over subcarrier k. Thus, the received rate of user j ∈ Nc
over subcarrier k is given by the multiple input single output
capacity with power constraint on each antenna as in [9]:
Rjk(pk) =
W
L
log
(
1 +
(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hijk|
√
pikd
−α
ij
)2
σ2 +
∑
l∈H |hljk|2plkd−αlj
)
, (1)
where pk is the vector of power allocations of all RRHs over
subcarrier k and W is the transmission bandwidth. It has been
shown in [9] that the optimal signaling to achieve this capacity
is to use beamforming weight vector v where each entry vi is
the weight of RRH i and is given by:
vi =
h∗ijk
√
pikd
−α
ij
|hijk|
∑
l∈Kc
√
plkd
−α
lj
. (2)
Based on this transmission scheme and the rate equation in (1),
and in order to ensure fairness, the CU assigns subcarrier k to
user j∗ ∈ Nc such that:
j∗ = arg max
j
∑|Kc|
i=1 |hijk|
√
d−αij
R¯jk
, (3)
assuming that transmissions occur within time frames and R¯jk
is the average rate over the previous time slots. Since each BS
assigns each subcarrier to one of its users, hereinafter, we drop
the user index j for brevity. The CU finds the optimal power
allocations p for all RRHs that maximize the sum of rates over
L subcarriers:
max
p
L∑
k=1
Rk(pk), s.t.
L∑
k=1
pik ≤ Pi,max, ∀i ∈ Kc. (4)
As for the BSs in H, the received rate at each user j in Ni
from BS i transmission will be:
Rijk(pik) =
W
L
log
(
1 +
|hijk|2pikd−αij
σ2 +
∑
l∈H∪Kc,l 6=i |hljk|2plkd−αlj
)
,
(5)
Based on (5), BS i allocates subcarrier k to user j∗ in Ni
such that: j∗ = arg maxj
|hijk|
R¯jk
. Each BS i is required to find
its transmission powers pik so that the sum of rates over all
subcarriers is maximized:
max
pik
L∑
k=1
Rik(pik), s.t.
L∑
k=1
pik ≤ Pi,max. (6)
The BSs in the HetNet operate independently of each other
and of the CRAN. Hence, the CU and the BSs must find their
optimal transmission powers in a distributed manner. However,
the RRHs and the BSs will mutually interfere which, in turn,
affects their users’ received rates. This motivates the adoption
of a game-theoretic approach, as explained next.
III. DISTRIBUTED POWER ALLOCATION: GAME THEORY
AND COGNITIVE HIERARCHY
This problem is formulated as a static noncooperative game
defined by the triplet (P, (Si)i∈P , (Ui)i∈P) where the P =
H ∪ {CU} is the set of players. The strategy vector pi of
each player i is to choose its transmission power values over
all the subcarriers. Hence, the strategy set for BS i in H
is: Si = {pi ∈ [0, Pi,max]L s.t.
∑L
k=1 pik = Pi,max}, and
the strategy set for the CU in the CRAN is SC = {pc ∈∏
i∈Kc [0, Pi,max] s.t.
∑L
k=1 pik = Pi,max∀i ∈ Kc}. The utility
for each BS i will be:
Ui(pi,p−i) =
L∑
k=1
Rik(pik) (7)
where V = H ∪ Kc and dik is the distance between BS i and
the user assigned to subcarrier k. Similarly, the CU’s utility is:
UC(pc,p−c) =
L∑
k=1
Rk(pk) (8)
A. Nash Equilibrium Solution
The conventional solution for this formulated game is the so-
called Nash equilibrium [14]. In particular, a strategy profile p∗
is said to constitute a Nash equilibrium (NE) if:
Ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(pi,p∗−i) ∀i ∈ P,pi ∈ Si. (9)
where p−i is the vector of strategies of all players except i.
To derive the NE for this game, we first determine the best
response strategy for each player i ∈ P . For each BS i ∈ H,
the best response is the well known water-filling solution [10].
Remark 1. Given a fixed power policy p−i, the optimal strategy
(best response) of BS i is given by:
pik =
(
W
Lµi
− 1
cik
)+
, (10)
where cik is given by:
cik =
|hik|2d−αik
σ2 +
∑
l∈V,l 6=i |hlk|2plkd−αlk
, (11)
and µi satisfies:
∑L
k=1
(
W
Lµi
− 1cik
)+
= Pi,max.
This follows from the fact that utility function is concave in
pi since it is a sum of log functions such that each term is a log
function of pik (for 1 ≤ k ≤ L). Also, the constraint function
of pik in (6) is a linear function of pik (for 1 ≤ k ≤ L). Thus,
the optimal solution is found using the KKT conditions.
Proposition 1. The best response of the CU is the solution of
the nonlinear equations:
∀i ∈ Kc, 1 ≤ k ≤ L,
W
(
c2ik − cik√pik
∑
l 6=i,l∈Kc clk
√
plk
)
L
(
ek +
(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2) − µi = 0,
µi
( L∑
k=1
pik − Pi,max
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ Kc, (12)
where cik and ek are given by respectively:
cik = |hik|
√
d−αik ,
ek = σ
2 +
∑
l∈H, |hlk|2plkd−αlk .
Proof: We first show that log
(
1 +(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2
σ2+I
)
is concave in the variables
pik (1 ≤ i ≤ |Kc|) by showing that the function(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2
is concave. This function can
be written as:( |Kc|∑
i=1
|hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2
=
( |Kc|∑
i=1
|hik|2pikd−αik
+
∑
i6=r
|hik||hrk|
√
pikprkd
−α
ik d
−α
rj
)
.
In the above equation, the first sum is a linear sum of pik
for 1 ≤ i ≤ |Kc|. Also, each term of the second sum can
be easily seen to be concave in pik and prk since in general
the function
√
xy is concave in x and y. Thus, the function(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2
is a sum of concave functions in
pik for 1 ≤ i ≤ |Kc| and is therefore concave. Also in
general, the function log(1 + x) is increasing concave function
of x. Thus, the function log
(
1 +
(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2
σ2+I
)
is
an increasing concave function of
(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2
.
Thus, it is concave using the general property that a monotonic
concave transformation of a concave function is concave. It
follows that the utility function of the CU in (8) is also concave
since it is the sum of concave functions in pik, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Kc|.
Thus, the optimal solution can be found using KKT conditions.
The existence of the NE is presented next.
Proposition 2. There exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium
for the heterogeneous cloud power allocation game.
Proof: This follows directly from [15, Proposition 20.3].
At the NE, the CU or each BS considers the strategies made
by all other devices when choosing its own strategy. This can be
detrimental to low-powered BSs who will need to respond to a
high level of interference caused by the CRAN and macro BSs,
and hence, will choose a more conservative power allocation.
To overcome this challenge, we will next develop a new game-
theoretic model based on cognitive hierarchy theory [12].
B. Cognitive Hierarchy Approach
Under cognitive hierarchy (CH), devices are organized into
a hierarchy such that the CRAN and macro BSs are placed at
the higher hierarchy levels, while low-powered BSs are placed
at the lower hierarchy levels. Each player assumes that the
other players belong to equal or lower hierarchy levels when
selecting its strategy. This allows low-powered BSs to choose
less conservative actions than in a conventional NE. We adopt
the Poisson CH model in [12] with the following considerations.
First, players are distributed across hierarchy levels according
to a Poisson distribution f of rate τ . Moreover, a player at
level k knows the true distributions of players which are at
lower levels. This is known as the overconfidence assumption
and it is a realistic assumption for cases in which players
are humans for example. Using hierarchical approaches for
power allocation in HetNets has been earlier investigated using
Stackelberg games [13]. Stackelberg games, however, rely on
only a two level hierarchy composed of leaders and followers,
while CH allows for multiple levels of hierarchy, which is
more suitable to our setting. Further, in Stackelberg games,
both leaders and followers consider the actions of each others
when choosing their actions. This may not be very effective for
reducing interference on low-powered BSs.
In the HetNet tier, the maximum transmit power of a BS
is dependent on its type. For instance, a larger BS has a
higher maximum transmit power, and thus, it can cause higher
interference on smaller BSs. To mitigate this high interference,
we group the BSs based on their type, using the CH level
approach. In particular, femtocell BSs, who have the lowest
power, are assumed to belong to level 1 while pico BSs belong
to level 2, macro BSs belong to level 3, and the CRAN belongs
to the last level. In order to reduce the interference among BSs
of the same type, the overconfidence assumption of the Poisson
CH model is modified so that BSs consider the actions of BSs
of the same type. However, in CH, each BS takes its action
based on its beliefs and does not learn the power values of the
BSs of the same type. Thus, we assume that each player at level
k believes that all other players of the same type act using the
same strategy. Consequently, the utility of BS i at level m is:
Uim(pi,p−i) =
W
L
L∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|hik|2pikd−αik
σ2 + Egm [I(p−i)])
)
, (13)
where
Egm [I(p−i)] = gm(m)
∑
l∈V,l 6=i
|hlk|2pikd−αlk
+
∑
l∈V,l 6=i
m−1∑
h=0
gm(h)|hlk|2plk(h)d−αlk ,
and gm(h) is the proportion of players at level h (1 ≤ h ≤ m).
It is given by: gm(h) =
f(h)∑m
i=0 f(i)
.
For the CRAN, we assume that the CU is aware that there
are no other players at the same level. This can be achieved by
selecting a proper value of the Poisson distribution parameter
τ that satisfies f(4) ≈ 0 in the CH model. One suitable value
here is: τ = 1. The utility of the CU at level 4 is thus given by:
UC(pC ,p−C) =
W
L
L∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
pikd
−α
ik
)2
σ2 + Eg4 [I(p−i)]
)
,
(14)
where
Eg4 [I(p−i)] =
H∑
l=0
3∑
h=0
g4(h)|hlk|2plk(h)d−αlk . (15)
The equilibrium for the CH case is defined next.
Definition 1. A strategy profile p∗ is said to constitute a
cognitive hierarchy equilibrium (CHE) iff:
p∗j = arg max
pj∈Sj
Ujm(pj ,p
∗
−j) ∀j ∈ P, (16)
where m is the CH level of player j. For this CH game, the
equilibrium strategy for each BS and for the CU are given
respectively by the following two propositions.
Proposition 3. The CHE strategy for each BS i ∈ H at CH level
m is achieved by solving the following system of equations:
∀1 ≤ k ≤ L,
WcikIm−1
L(Im−1 +Dmp∗ik)(Im−1 + (cik +Dm)p
∗
ik)
− µi = 0,
µi(
L∑
k=1
p∗ik − Pi,max) = 0, (17)
where cik = |hik|2d−αik , Dm = gm(m)
∑
l∈V,l 6=i |hlk|2d−αlk ,
Im−1 = σ2 +
∑
l∈V,l 6=i
∑m−1
h=0 gm(h)|hlk|2p∗lk(h)d−αlk .
Proof: It can be easily shown that the function log(1 +
ax
bx+c ) is concave in x ∀a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, x ≥ 0. Thus, the
term log
(
1 +
|hik|2pikd−αik
σ2+Egm [I(p−i)])
)
is concave in pik. Thus, the
utility in (13) is a sum of concave functions.
Proposition 4. The CHE strategy of the CU is the solution of
the nonlinear equations:
∀i ∈ Kc, 1 ≤ k ≤ L,
W
(
c2ik − cik√p∗ik
∑
l 6=i,l∈Kc clk
√
p∗lk
)
L
(
ek +
(∑|Kc|
i=1 |hik|
√
p∗ikd
−α
ik
)2) − µi = 0,
µi
( L∑
k=1
p∗ik − Pi,max
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ Kc, (18)
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Fig. 1: Average rate per type versus number of RRHs.
where cik and ek are given by respectively:
cik = |hik|
√
d−αik ,
ek = σ
2 +
∑H
l=0
∑3
h=0 g4(h)|hlk|2p∗lk(h)d−αlk .
Proof: The utility of the CU in the CH case is still the same
function of pik as in (8). Hence, the function is concave and the
above equations are obtained by applying the KKT conditions.
Based on (17) and (18), each player at level m finds the level
h CHE power p∗lk(h) for each other player l and for all h < m
in order to find its CHE strategy.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To assess the performance achieved by both NE and CH,
the following values are considered: |Kc| = 40, |Nc| = 70,
|Km| = 5, |Ni| = 25 ∀i ∈ Km, |Kp| = 5, |Ni| = 15 ∀i ∈ Kp,
|Kf | = 5, |Ni| = 7 ∀i ∈ Kf , L = 8, σ2 = −90.8 dBm, and
W = 100 MHz. Also, the BSs of the same type are assumed
to have the same maximum transmit power such that: Pc,max =
30 dBm, Pm,max = 37 dBm, Pp,max = 27 dBm, Pf,max = 20
dBm. The RRHs, the BSs, and the CRAN users are deployed
uniformly within a 3×3 km rectangular grid. The HetNet users
are deployed uniformly within a circle centered at each BS of
radius equal to the coverage of each BS. The coverage radius of
the macro, pico, and femto BSs are set to: rm = 1000 m, rp =
150 m, and rf = 10 m respectively. All channel coefficients are
generated according to a Rayleigh distribution with variance 10
dBm. Statistical results are averaged over a large number of
independent runs. For comparisons, we consider the NE, the
proposed CHE, and an equal power allocation scheme.
Fig. 1 shows that average rate of the CRAN increases with
the number of RRH while the average rate of the BSs in H
decreases due to interference. In this figure, we can see a drastic
increase in the sum-rate of femtocells and picocells under CH
as opposed to the NE. The average sum-rate of the pico and
femto BS increases from 107 bits/sec to 108 and 109 bits/sec,
respectively. As for the macro cells and the CRAN, the average
sum-rate decreases slightly with CH. The average decrease is
only 2.4% for macro BSs and 2.6% for the CRAN.
Fig. 2 shows the sum-rate of the CRAN varies with the
maximum RRH transmit power. Clearly, the average CRAN
sum-rate increases while that of the BSs decreases due to the
increased interference. In Fig. 2, we can also see, analogously
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Fig. 3: Average total rate versus number of RRHs.
to Fig. 1, that CH yields significant overall rate improvements,
particularly for pico and femto BSs.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the average total system rate as the
number of RRHs and their maximum power vary, respectively.
Fig. 3 shows a considerable improvement in the total system
rate when CH is used compared to both cases of NE and equal
power policy. The improvement in the total system rate is on the
average double the total sum-rate of the NE and the equal power
policy. Fig. 4 further corroborates such rate improvements at all
RRH transmit power values. Clearly, the proposed CH power
allocation approach improves considerably the performance of
the low-powered (pico and femto) BSs without degrading the
performance of the CRAN and the macro BSs. It also results in
a considerable improvement in the overall system performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of power control
in a hybrid cellular network in which a CRAN and a small
cell heterogeneous network co-exist. We have formulated the
problem as a noncooperative game and we have studied the
solution under a conventional Nash equilibrium and under a case
in which the base stations are grouped in hierarchies according
to the framework of cognitive hierarchy theory. Simulation
results have shown a considerable system performance in terms
of the total sum-rate compared to conventional solutions. The
results have also shown that the proposed CH based approach
reduces considerably the interference on the low-powered pico
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Fig. 4: Average total rate versus RRH maximum transmit power.
and femto cells without jeopardizing the performance of macro
base stations and the CRAN.
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